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CHALLENGING AUTHORITY FOR
MUNICIPAL SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS:
THE ULTRA VIRES ATTACK
Frona M. Powell*
INTRODUCTION
The deteriorating public infrastructure and explosive suburban growth in
most metropolitan areas today have created a fiscal crisis for many of the
nation's cities. Local governments must maintain and frequently expand
existing capital improvements such as streets, water and sewage facilities,
parks, and schools to accommodate rapid growth in suburban areas. Mean-
while, the costs for such capital improvements continue to increase., In
addition, taxpayers expect their municipality to provide an ever-increasing
array of services. However, they resist property tax increases to fund such
expansion projects, 2 even though the lack of adequate capital facilities may
threaten economic progress.' The reduction in available federal funds and
difficulty in marketing traditional debt instruments in an uncertain economic
climate further exacerbate the problem. 4
Cities have relatively few funding sources for necessary capital improve-
ment and expansion projects. In most states, local governments can raise
property taxes, increase debt financing,5 or decrease services, none of which
are very attractive alternatives. 6 For this reason, cities are increasingly looking
to municipal exactions 7 and a newer and more controversial form of exaction,
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University.
1. For example, in 1967 the general cost of building a one lane mile of road was $100,000.
In 1986, the cost to construct a one lane mile of road increased to $300,000. Nicholas, Impact
Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 90
(1987).
2. Larsen & Zimet, Impact Fees: Et Tu, Illinois?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 489, 490 (1988)
(recognizing that the public's and the development community's resistance to property tax
increases has resulted in both a lack of funding for needed facilities and untimely construction
of new facilities).
3. Nicholas, supra note 1, at 85 ("The public capital stock [of local municipalities],
commonly called infrastructure, has been allowed to deteriorate to the extent that its lack of
availability frequently constitutes a serious impediment to economic progress.")
4. Bauman & Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American
Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 52 (1987).
5. In many jurisdictions, state mandated limitations on indebtedness restrict the amount
of debt issued, and some states have constitutional limits on the amount of taxes permitted.
See generally Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1980).
6. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 4, at 52-53.
7. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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"impact fees," 8 as sources of municipal funding for major off-site capital
improvements and services. 9
Today, municipal exactions for on-site needs such as streets, sidewalks
and sewers are well accepted.' 0 More innovative methods of financing im-
provements such as "in-lieu fees,"" impact fees, and most recently "link-
age,"' 2 however, have been consistently challenged. In particular, developers
argue that these are devices by which municipalities shift the cost of public
facilities and social programs to private developers. 3
One criticism of subdivision development fees is that they ultimately place
the burden of providing public facilities on newcomers in the community
because the cost is reflected in the price of new housing. This in turn results
in higher costs and decreased housing opportunities which may ultimately
deter business or industry. 14 It is contended that impact fees may create a
double taxation problem because new owners pay existing property taxes
and the exaction fee reflected in the cost of their new home." It is also
suggested that exaction fees deter rehabilitation and redevelopment of urban
and older areas by burdening the project with additional costs. 16
Some oppose the use of exaction and impact fees as alternative funding
mechanisms for off-site municipal capital services and facilities because they
appear antithetical to traditional planning principles. The "pay as you go"
philosophy, they contend, creates the illusion that the character, location,
8. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
9. See generally Bauman & Ethier, supra note 4, at 52; Conners & High, The Expanding
Circle of Exactions: From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1987);
Delaney, Gordon & Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision
Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1987); Fischel,
The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 101 (1987); Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest
for a Rationale, 52 Cornell Law Q. 871 (1967); Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An
Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA ST. U.L. REV. 415 (1981);
Kayden & Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analysis: The Connection
Between Office Development and Housing, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 127 (1987); Larsen &
Zimet, supra note 2, at 491; Nicholas, supra note 1, at 86; Pavelko, Subdivision Exactions: A
Review of Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 269 (1983); Siemon, Who
Bears the Cost?, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (1987); Smith, From Subdivision Improvement
Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of
Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1987); Taub, Exactions, Linkages,
and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Perspective, 20 URn. LAW. 515 (1988); Tiburzi,
Impact Fees in Maryland, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 502 (1988).
10. Smith, supra note 9, at 7.
11. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
13. Conners & High, supra note 9, at 69 (stating that, in effect, exactions "permit munic-
ipalities to transfer the financial burden associated with growth and development onto the
parties responsible for such growth: the developers and residents of new developments")
14. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 4, at 53.
15. Id. at 54.
16. Smith, supra note 9, at 30.
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and magnitude of a particular land use is simply a matter of paying the cost
of the project, rather than measuring the appropriateness of a particular
land use at a particular location. 7 Many see these off-site municipal exactions
as a form of municipal extortion, 8 a concrete example of Holmes' aphorism
of the "petty larceny of the police power. '"19
Despite these criticisms, in recent years municipalities have increased the
use of exactions and impact fees to defer capital improvement costs. 20 Not
surprisingly, the number of court challenges to such fees has also increased.
This Article first explores the nature and history of subdivision exactions,
beginning with on-site dedication of land to the newest and most controversial
exaction form, linkage payments for low-income housing and municipal
services such as transportation. 2' The Article then addresses the legal issues
developers raise in challenging off-site municipal exactions, in-lieu fees and
impact fees. Specifically, this Article examines what is frequently the thresh-
old issue addressed by the courts in such cases: whether the municipalities'
exaction or fee requirement was ultra vires, or beyond its statutory authority
under state enabling legislation. 22 If the developer can succeed on the basis
of this ultra vires attack, it is unnecessary to address the question of whether
the exaction was constitutionally imposed under an appropriate reasonable-
ness test, or whether it was an unconstitutional taking of property in violation
of due process of law. 23
Courts frequently treat the ultra vires argument as a simple exercise in
statutory interpretation or interpretation of legislative intent. However, there
are substantial policy questions involved in this determination, as well as
unspoken assumptions about the appropriate relationship between the state
17. Siemon, supra note 9, at 122.
18. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 4, at 55-56. See J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson,
121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981) (invalidating a development exaction because it
amounted to extortion); accord Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 17, 246 N.W.2d
19, 26 (1976) (same).
19. 1 HOLMEs-LASKI LETTERS 457 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
20. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 4, at 59. According to the authors' survey, there has been
a significant increase in the incidence of impact fees over the last few decades. 350 of all
current impact fee policies were enacted between 1980 and 1985. An additional 36% were
enacted in the 1970's and 18.706 in the 1960's. Only 10.306 of current impact fee policies
existed before 1960. Id.
21. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. See generally Kayden & Pollard, supra
note 9; Smith, supra note 9; Note, Chicago's Linked Development Fund: The Legality of
Imposing an Exaction Fee on Large-Scale Downtown Office Developments, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 205 (1987).
22. Smith, supra note 9, at 9; Pavelko, supra note 9, at 280-81. In the context of municipal
exactions, ultra vires means that the municipality lacks the statutory or inherent authority to
impose such an exaction. Smith, supra note 9, at 9.
23. See City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363, 364 (Ala. 1978)
(dedication requirement was unconstitutional due to lack of specific legislative authority); Briar
West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 176, 291 N.W.2d 730, 733 (1980) (city's imposition
of costs of future paving upon developer was without authority).
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and local government and the extent to which courts should intervene in
local planning decisions. This Article explores those assumptions and con-
cludes that the traditional legal standards for reviewing whether a local
exaction ordinance is ultra vires are no longer appropriate. Rather than
strictly construing the powers of local governments to require express au-
thorization for off-site exactions and impact fees, courts should broadly
construe state enabling legislation to permit local governments to assess
appropriate exaction and/or impact fees which are rationally connected to
new development, unless they are expressly prohibited from doing so by
state statute.
I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL EXACTIONS AND
DEVELOPMENT FEES
A. From On-Site Exactions To Linkage Fees
The evolution of subdivision exactions from on-site dedication of land to
the newest concept, linkage, has occurred within a relatively short period of
time. 24 In just a few years, the idea of using development exactions to fund
off-site capital facilities has grown from theory to full-blown fad. 25 As cities
continue to seek solutions to local capital development funding problems,
the trend toward using exactions and development fees as a partial solution
to those problems will surely continue. On the other hand, the same is true
for developers' challenges to the legality of such requirements. In such a
dynamic, growing area of law, it is no surprise that courts today are divided
over the necessary authority for such exactions 26 and the legal standards
which should apply. 27 This division results in different jurisdictions taking
different positions on the legality of exaction fees and dedication require-
24. Municipalities first began requiring exactions in the Great Depression of the 1930's due
to increased delinquencies in special assessment payments. See generally Smith, supra note 9,
at 6.
25. Siemon, supra note 9, at 115 (noting that in a short period of time over forty local
governments have employed exaction financing for projects such as roads, parks, potable water,
libraries, sewer systems, solid waste disposal, police, fire, and other emergency services).
26. For example, some courts find the necessary authority either expressly or impliedly
granted under state enabling legislation. See infra notes 77-103 and accompanying text. Other
courts find authority for exactions through broadly interpreted home rule powers. See infra
notes 104-23 and accompanying text. Still others find the necessary authority under a munici-
pality's general police powers. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
27. Three different legal standards, in varying degrees of scrutiny, are applied. Some states
require that in order for an exaction to withstand scrutiny it must be specifically and uniquely
attributable to the development. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text. Some states
require only that the exaction be reasonably related to the use of the development. See infra
notes 168-77 and accompanying text. The majority employ a third standard and require that
there be a rational nexus between the exaction and the use of the development. See infra notes
178-85 and accompanying text.
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ments. 2s The terminology used in defining such exactions, such as develop-
ment fees, in-lieu fees, and impact fees adds to the confusion because these
terms may mean different things in different communities. 29 And while most
cities have established their subdivision approval policies through local or-
dinance, some local governments have no formal written policy, and instead
impose exactions or impact fees on a project-by-project basis.3 0 Thus, in any
given case, the terms used by the local government may mean slightly
different things, and the procedures and requirements for implementing local
policies may differ. With this caveat in mind, a few generalizations can be
made.
An exaction can be defined as a traditional construction, dedication, or
in-lieu fee payment for site-specific needs imposed by a municipality at the
time of subdivision approval. 3 The most common and accepted form of
exaction is on-site dedication for site-specific improvements such as streets,
sidewalks, and drainage.32 In some jurisdictions, the city may also require
the developer to construct the on-site improvement before dedicating the
land to the municipality. 3 While somewhat more controversial, municipal
requirements for on-site dedications of land for parks and educational
purposes are usually upheld as well.34
28. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 416.
29. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 4, at 55 (noting that a survey of 1,000 communities
resulted in a confusing mixture of meanings to the various terms).
30. Id. at 57.
31. Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 9, at 139. "Exaction" has also been defined as
describing municipal fees imposed upon the final approval of a developer's subdivision plan
which shift capital development costs from the municipality to the developer. Pavelko, supra
note 9, at 270 n.9. Exaction occurs when a developer receives the "privilege" of developing
the land and the local government receives land or money to provide certain public services
that the project requires. See Note, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: Unprecedented
Intrusion upon a State's Judgment of the Proper Means to be Applied in Land Use Regulation,
21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 641, 641 n.3 (1988).
For purposes of this Article, the terms "city" and "municipality" are used to include other
forms of regional local government which may include counties, towns, villages, and townships.
32. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 418.
33. Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 9, at 141.
34. See Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone Co., 144 Mont. 25, 34, 394 P.2d 182, 187
(1964) (upholding statute which required developer to donate land for parks and playgrounds
as a condition to municipal approval of a subdivision plat). The court quoted with approval
from Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 II1. 2d 375, 380, 176
N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961) as follows: "[tihere can be no controversy about the obvious fact that
the orderly devetopment of a municipality must necessarily include a consideration of the present
and future need for school and public recreational facilities." 144 Mont. at 34, 394 P.2d at
187. See Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 11. App. 3d 334, 339, 354 N.E.2d 489, 494 (2d
Dist. 1976) (exaction requiring donation of land for park permitted); accord Associated Builders
v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 647, 484 P.2d 606, 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 616 (statute
requiring fee for use in purchase or maintenance of parks upheld), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S.
878 (1971). See also Bayswater Realty Capital Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Lewisbaro, 149 A.D.2d
49, 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d 613, 616 (1989) (planning board possessed authority to require, as
1990]
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In some instances, local government may condition subdivision approval
upon dedication of land or construction of improvements off the develop-
ment site." For example, a municipality may require a developer to bear his
pro-rata share of the costs of installing an off-site water line as a condition
to subdivision approval.36 Generally, municipalities have met with mixed
results in cases challenging these off-site exactions. 37 In one such case, a
municipality required a developer to construct improvements to existing
public highways that abutted the proposed subdivision plat." The Virginia
Supreme Court held that this condition attached to plat approval was invalid
because the municipality lacked statutory authority to require such a con-
condition to approval of subdivision plat, fee in lieu of land dedication for park, playground,
or other recreational purpose); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 618,
137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (1965) (equalization fee requirement for purpose of capital improvement
of parks, schools, and recreation areas upheld), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
Dedication of land on-site for school and park purposes is generally approved because
residents of the new development will benefit from their proximity to the facilities. Delaney,
Gordon & Hess, supra note 9, at 142. See generally Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at
418.
35. See, e.g., Divan Builders v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 596, 334 A.2d 30, 37 (1975)
(municipality could require installation of off-site improvement as condition of subdivision
approval, but subdivider could be required only to bear the cost of such improvement bearing
a rational nexus to the needs created by and benefits conferred upon the subdivision); cf.
Hylton Enters. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 441, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1979) (holding
there was no authority for county to require a developer to construct portions of routes that
abutted the subdivision as a prerequisite to approval of his subdivision plat). Communities
sometimes impose off-site exactions for schools, roads, parks and recreation, libraries, public
safety and other purposes. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 9, at 58.
36. See Baltica Constr. v. Planning Bd., 222 N.J. Super. 428, 432, 537 A.2d 319, 322 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (condition to plat approval that developer bear entire cost of off-
site waterline overturned because board failed to allocate pro rata share to developer). In similar
cases, a developer may be required to dedicate land or grant an easement on land bordering
the subdivision plat. For example, in Colborne v. Village of Corrales, 106 N.M. 103, 739 P.2d
972 (1987), a developer sought approval from the village for subdivision of land within its
planning and platting jurisdiction. The village followed its policy requiring landowners to
dedicate a sixty-foot easement along the Main Canal for a potential north-south road as a
condition for subdivision approval. On appeal by the developer, the New Mexico Supreme
Court upheld such condition as a valid exercise of the police power. Id. at 106, 739 P.2d at
973-74.
37. See C.P.W. Investments #2 v. City of Troy, 156 Mich. App. 577, 583, 401 N.W.2d
864, 867 (1987) (city had authority to require, as condition of final plat approval, that developer
bear costs of paving portion of city road which abutted proposed subdivision tract); Divan
Builders, 66 N.J. at 582, 334 A.2d at 30 (Planning Act empowers municipalities to require
developers to install or contribute to the cost of off-site improvements). But see Baltica Constr.
v. Planning Bd., 222 N.J. Super. 428, 432, 537 A.2d 319, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (condition to plat approval that developer bear the entire cost of installing an off-site
water line was overturned because the board failed to allocate to developer its pro-rata share);
Hylton Enters. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 441, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1979) (local
government may not require, as a prerequisite to plat approval, that the developer construct
improvements to existing public highways which abut the subdivision).
38. 220 Va. at 438, 258 S.E.2d at 579.
[Vol. 39:635
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dition. Furthermore, the court held that the construction, repair and main-
tenance of state highways was a function of the state, rather than the local
government.3 9
In other instances, a municipality may permit or require a developer to
pay a fee rather than dedicate land as a condition of subdivision approval.
These fees, called in-lieu fees, generally have a narrow focus because they
are a refinement of the dedication requirement. As such, they are tied to
the type of use ordinarily associated with land dedication, such as open
space for parks or land for schools.4 In-lieu fees are particularly useful
when the development project is small, and the land available for dedication
is inadequate or ill-suited for an on-site capital improvement. In cases where
a number of small developments combine to create severe demands on a
city's infrastructure and services, each subdivision may not be wholly re-
sponsible for the expanding need for capital improvements, but each con-
tributes in some way to that need.4 1 In such cases, payment of "equalization"
fees or in-lieu fees to fund these off site improvements may be a solution
to the cumulative problems associated with rapid growth in a community.4 2
Although some jurisdictions have declared in-lieu fee ordinances invalid
for lack of statutory authority or because the fees constitute an impermissible
tax, other jurisdictions have upheld such requirements.4 3 Courts upholding
such fees generally recognize that explosive growth places a substantial
demand upon a city's ability to provide essential services such as water,
sewer and park facilities." An in-lieu fee ordinance, however, must specify
39. Id. at 441, 258 S.E.2d at 581.
40. Conners & High, supra note 9, at 71-72.
41. This is especially true in the cases of schools or parks. Where smaller tracts of land are
subdivided, it is usually impractical to require dedication of land within the subdivision. See
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 621-22, 137 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1965)
(court upheld an equalization fee required in lieu of dedicating land), appeal dismissed, 385
U.S. 4 (1966).
42. Id. at 162, 137 N.W.2d at 622; Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 898 (Wyo.
1983) (city may require a developer to pay a fee to connect developed property to city water
and sewer lines).
43. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 610-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(requirement that a developer dedicate land or pay a fee to the county as a condition of plat
approval was permissible as long as the dedication or fee offsets the subdivision needs, and as
long as the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for the benefit of the subdivision residents);
Jordan, 28 Wis. 2d at 622, 137 N.W.2d at 450 (upholding statute which required payment of
an equalization fee which would be used for the capital improvement of parks, schools, and
recreation areas); Coulter, 662 P.2d at 898 (upholding statute which allowed municipality to
levy sewer and water connection charges). Contra City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land
Co., 355 So. 2d 363, 365 (Ala. 1978) (without legislative grant, municipality had no power to
levy assessments for municipal improvements).
44. See Coulter, 662 P.2d at 890. The court in Coulter noted:
With the onslaught of energy development in Wyoming during the 1970's, the
population of Rawlins increased substantially and projections indicate that by 1990
the City's total number of inhabitants will increase 148% over the 1970 population.
In response to these projections, the City Council reasoned that the demand for
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
that the use of the fees must primarily, although not exclusively, benefit the
residents of the new development. 45 It is a limited concept because in-lieu
fees can only be used where a dedication of land would also be appropriate.
46
The impact fee is an expansion of the in-lieu fee requirement. Local
governments levy impact fees against new developments to generate revenue
for capital facilities, the need for which is created by the developments
themselves. 47 The impact fee is a more flexible concept than the in-lieu fee
because its application is broader-it may be used to fund area-wide projects
such as large-scale water and sewage facilities, parks, roads and schools.
41
Some commentators favor the impact fee because it applies to a broader
range of development projects49 and is a source of funding for facilities not
normally subject to dedication requirements.50 Unlike in-lieu fees, local
governments can assess impact fees against lands already platted because
impact fees are usually paid when building permits or certificates of occu-
pancy are issued, rather than at the time of subdivision platting.5 As a
result, some suggest that impact fees more accurately correlate impacts and
assessments than do dedication or in-lieu fees because the impact fee is
assessed at the time the growth occurs and is generally based on the square
footage or number of rooms in a development.52
Not surprisingly, there has been strong resistance to local governments'
use of impact fees to generate revenue for off-site capital improvements. As
a policy matter, it is argued that the price for these improvements ultimately
falls on new residents, thereby deterring business and industry expansion in
the community. 3 Critics suggest that such fees essentially make development
"for sale," and that the appropriateness and quality of development is an
City services such as water, sewer and park facilities would also increase and that
there was a need to offset the projected impact. According to a plan developed by
the City, it was estimated that approximately $36,000,000 in capital improvements
would be needed to expand the sewer and water system in order to meet the 1990
population estimate.
Id.
45. Conners & High, supra note 9, at 71.
46. Taub, supra note 9, at 522.
47. Conners & High, supra note 9, at 71-72.
48. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 417.
49. Non-subdivision projects such as condominiums, apartments, and commercial devel-
opments which may not be subject to in-lieu fee requirements can be assessed impact fees.
Taub, supra note 9, at 522.
50. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 420. New forms of exactions such as impact
fees and linkage may finance not only traditional improvements, but nontraditional improve-
ments and services such as child day care, public art, historic artifacts, public transit systems,
bookmobiles, jogging tracks, helicopter pads, recreational community gardening, job training,
low or moderate-income housing, library sites, and police and fire stations. Taub, supra note
9, at 517.
51. Id. at 522.
52. Id.
53. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 4, at 53.
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issue separate from its impact on community facilities and services. Too
often, it is argued, municipalities view the costs and benefits of development
only in the short term, and overlook community-wide benefits of develop-
ment at the time exactions are made.14 The rise of impact fees and other
innovative forms of financing may be seen as an ultimate encroachment by
government over private property rights.
Even an on-site dedication ordinance can be subject to this attack. In
1980, a Texas court of appeals held unconstitutional under the state consti-
tution a city park dedication ordinance which required a developer to dedicate
sites within a subdivision for park purposes, or pay a fee in-lieu thereof."
The court said, "[tlo permit municipalities and other governmental entities
further to extend their encroachment over private property rights in this way
under the guise of protecting the public's safety, health, and general welfare,
makes a mockery of the spirit as well as the letter of our Constitution. 5 6
The most innovative extension of the exaction/impact fee concept has
occurred in California and Massachusetts, where the cities of San Francisco
and Boston have recently enacted ordinances which attempt to finance new
housing and social programs in the same way public facilities are financed.
This concept, called linkage, links the right to construct large downtown
developments to the requirement of constructing or providing new residential
housing, based upon the number of workers expected to occupy the proposed
space. 7 Linkage ordinances require the developer to pay a fee or actually
build the new housing as a condition of development approval. These
ordinances have met with mixed results, and some think recent Supreme
Court decisions may dissuade similar projects in the future. This will be
especially true if the only link between the proposed project and the fee is
that the developer needs a permit and the government wants to fund an
otherwise unfunded program. 8
B. Rationales for Imposing Subdivision Exactions
The original rationale underlying judicial approval of subdivision exactions
was the theory of "privilege": a municipality could condition subdivision
54. These benefits include growth in retail sales and sales tax collection as well as growth
in employment which increases disposable income. Id. at 53-54.
55. Berg Dev. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980). The
court distinguished between municipal exaction requirements for parks and more traditional
exaction requirements as follows:
While government can clearly require the dedication of water mains and sewers as
well as property for streets and alleys, we believe these to be distinguishable from
the dedication of property for recreational purposes. The former bears a substantial
relation to the safety and health of the community while the latter does not.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Conners & High, supra note 9, at 77-83; Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 9, at
143-44.
58. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground
Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 749 (1988). See also infra notes 172-77 and
accompanying text.
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approval on dedication requirements because the approval was granted at
the municipality's discretion and because the developer "voluntarily" chose
to subdivide and sell his land by plat.5 9 Under this rationale, courts tradi-
tionally granted broad discretion to the municipality to impose even arbitrary
and unreasonable conditions, and for this reason it has since fallen from
favor. 60
In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,61 the basis for upholding a
compulsory land dedication exaction was the "benefit received" rationale,
which the court explained as follows:
The municipality by approval of a proposed subdivision plat enables the
subdivider to profit financially by selling the subdivision lots as home
building sites and thus realizing a greater price than could have been
obtained if he had sold his property as unplatted lands. In return for this
benefit the municipality may require him to dedicate part of his platted
land to meet a demand to which the municipality would not have been
put but for the influx of people into the community to occupy the
subdivision lots.
62
Like the privilege test, the benefit test may be undermined by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,63 which
seems to imply that property owners have a right to build on their property,
subject only to reasonable regulation, and that development is not a gov-
ernmentally conferred benefit.6 As a result of this decision, some suggest
that a rethinking of the nature of exactions may be in order, because much
of the law is based on the fiction of privilege and benefit to the property
owner, rather than on the exercise of coercive power by the government. 65
Courts today generally uphold exactions, if at all, on the theory that a
city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property is a substantial
public interest and therefore permissible through the reasonable exercise of
the police power. 6 Courts have developed several "reasonableness" tests to
59. Pavelko, supra note 9, at 283.
60. Id. The notion of "voluntariness" was recently utilized in Russ Bldg. Partnership v.
City of San Francisco, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 1505, 246 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25 (1987) (court,
upholding transit fees imposed on new development, stated: "the fees imposed by this Ordinance
are not compulsory but are exacted only if the developer voluntarily chooses to create new
office space").
61. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
62. Id. at 615, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
63. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
64. 483 U.S. at 833-34 & n.2 (stating that "the right to build on one's own property-even
though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot remotely be
described as a 'governmental benefit' ").
65. Berger, supra note 58, at 748.
66. The city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property is a substantial public
interest. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979), aff'd on rehearing, 614 P.2d
1257 (Utah 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).
In Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), the California Supreme
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determine whether an exaction is reasonable, 67 but a court must first deter-
mine whether the municipality's action was authorized under a state enabling
statute. If it was not, then the municipality's action is ultra vires and the
question whether the exaction is a valid exercise of the police power need
not be addressed. A determination that a city has surpassed its state-delegated
authority will be dispositive. 61
II. LEGAL CHALLENGES To MuNIcIPAL SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS
A. The Ultra Vires Attack: Traditional Approach
Whether a city has the express or implied power to impose a particular
requirement under state enabling legislation will determine if the requirement
is permissible. 69 It is a well-established rule that cities are creatures of the
state and as such can exercise only those powers that are expressly or
impliedly conferred to them by the state. 70 The rule that a municipal cor-
Court stated:
In short, the police power, as such is not confined within the narrow circumspection
of precedents, resting upon past conditions which do not cover and control present
day conditions obviously calling for revised regulations to promote the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the public; that is to say, as a commonwealth
develops politically, economically and socially, the police power likewise develops,
within reason, to meet the changed and changing conditions.
Id. at 484, 234 P. at 381. See generally Siemon, supra note 9, at 118 (to show that its interest
is genuine and substantial, the city must show a "comprehensive commitment to making its
physical environment in commercial and industrial areas more attractive") (emphasis in original)
(citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 532 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
67. See infra notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
68. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 421.
69. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978);
Albany Area Builders v. Guilderland, 141 A.D.2d 293, 534 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1988), appeal granted,
73 N.Y.2d 709, 538 N.E.2d 356, 534 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1989); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606
P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); Hylton Enter. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577
(1979); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983).
70. See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 427, 547 N.E.2d 346, 347, 548
N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (1989) (towns have only lawmaking powers which the state legislatures have
conferred upon them); accord Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 175-76, 291
N.W.2d 730, 732 (1980) (same); Town of Barrington v. Blake, 532 A.2d 955, 956 (R.I. 1987)
(police power is vested in the state and may be exercised by the several cities and counties only
when authorized by the general assembly); Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 Wis. 2d 10,
20, 440 N.W.2d 777, 781 (1989) (town has such powers which are necessarily implied from any
power conferred upon it by statute); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo.
1983) (municipality is a creature of the state and may exercise only state-conferred powers).
See also Osborn v. Board of County Comm'r, 764 P.2d 397, 400 (Colo. App. 1988) (Land Use
Control Enabling Act controls and restricts county's authority on land use regulation matters);
Eastern Planned Communities at Lincroft, Inc. v. Middletown Township, 235 N.J. Super. 467,
470, 563 A.2d 81, 82 (1989) (municipality's power to regulate land use law is delegated and
defined by the state municipal land use law).
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poration can only exercise powers granted to it by statute or those powers
necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes of its creation is often
referred to as "Dillon's Rule," after the writer of the first and most
important American treatise on municipal corporations."' Dillon endorsed
the notion that state power is "supreme and transcendent," and that the
courts should require municipal corporations to show a plain and clear grant
for any authority they exercise: "[w]ith firm hands, [courts have a duty] to
hold them and their officers within chartered limits. ' 72
The universal acceptance of Dillon's Rule has substantially limited a city's
ability to solve capital development problems through local legislation. One
writer stated:
American cities today do not have the power to solve their current problems
or to control their future development. Their impotence is expressed in
their legal status. Under current law, cities have no "natural" or "inher-
ent" power to do anything simply because they decide to do it. Cities
have only those powers delegated to them by state government, and
traditionally those delegated powers have been rigorously limited by judicial
interpretation. 71
Some recent decisions finding implied authority for local exaction or
impact fee ordinances under planning statutes, home rule legislation, 74 or
general police powers, however, reflect a growing belief that city impotence
under Dillon's Rule is no longer politically or socially defensible. For ex-
ample, under home rule, it may no longer be assumed that the municipality's
power to enact local legislation should be strictly construed against the
municipality. 75 However, the city must still demonstrate some basis for the
power to enact local exaction or impact fee ordinances. That authority may
be found under statutes expressly or impliedly granting such power, it may
be implied under home rule powers, it may be inherent in the reasonable
71. Frug, supra note 5, at 1064.
72. I. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed.
1911). Dillon stated:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted
in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Id.
73. Frug, supra note 5, at 1062.
74. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
75. Libonatti, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 50, 67-68 (1989).
Article VII of the Illinois Constitution states that "[plowers and functions of home rule units
shall be construed liberally," thus eliminating Dillon's rule of strict scrutiny. ILL. CONST. art.
VII. The New Jersey Constitution provides that it "shall be construed most favorably to
municipalities . . .[and] to give all municipalities the fullest and most complete powers possible."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.3 (West 1974-75 & Supp. 1989).
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exercise of the municipality's police powers, or it may be found in some
combination of all the above. 76
1. Express and Implied Authority Under Planning Enabling Legislation:
Two New Jersey Cases
Most states today expressly authorize cities to require internal street and
facility improvements as a condition of subdivision approval. However, most
do not expressly authorize in-lieu fees, off-site user impact fees, or municipal
exactions for parks and schools. 77 Express enabling legislation may be ad-
vantageous for cities because an ordinance is more likely to withstand legal
challenge if there is clear statutory authority for a city's actions. On the
other hand, express enabling legislation may limit as well as confer such
authority because any power not specifically included in the statute may be
prohibited by inference and thus the municipality's ability to seek innovative
solutions to unique local problems may be restricted. 78
Courts have recognized that the state legislative process would falter if the
state legislature were constitutionally required specifically to address the
myriad of situations to which a particular policy may be applied and to
formulate specific rules for each situation. 79 For this reason, a city has not
only the powers which are expressly granted to it by statute, but also those
powers necessary to enable it to discharge the duties and carry out the
purposes of the statutory grant.80
A city often relies on the powers granted by state planning or environ-
mental statutes for the implied authority to require particular exaction fees
not expressly granted by statute. Two New Jersey cases illustrate this ap-
proach. In 1974, in Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board of Wayne,8
Divan Builders applied to the Wayne Township Planning Board for approval
of a plan to construct thirty-one single family homes. A portion of the
76. The broad concept of the police power is used by courts to identify those state and
local government regulations and prohibitions which are valid and may be invoked without the
requirement of payment of compensation. Brooks, The Future of Municipal Parks in a Post-
Nollan World: A Survey of Takings Tests as Applied to Subdivision Exactions, 8 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCEs L. 141 (1988).
77. Some states, such as California, expressly authorize the dedication of land or payment
of in-lieu fees for park and recreational purposes. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66477 (West Supp.
1989). Other states, like Virginia, specifically prohibit certain conditions by statute. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 15.1-491.2 (1989). See infra note 195.
78. Brooks, supra note 76, at 169.
79. See Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n., 160 Conn. 109, 115, 273
A.2d 880, 883 (1970) (citing American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n., 329
U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
80. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc., 160 Conn. at 115, 273 A.2d at 883. See also Call v.
City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1979) (cities have powers necessarily implied to
carry out the responsibilities delegated by the state legislatures); Coulter v. City of Rawlins,
662 P.2d 888, 895 (Wyo. 1983) (municipality may exercise implied powers from a legislative
grant).
81. 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1974).
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building site was substantially covered by a pond, and the preliminary plan
provided for draining the pond and constructing a conduit to pipe the water
from its upstream source through the development and into an existing
drainage facility downstream. 2 Immediately before approval of the plan, the
Township amended its subdivision ordinance to establish procedures for
requiring off-site improvements as a condition of subdivision approval.83
Pursuant to this amendment, the planning board then included a condition
in its recommendation for final approval of the plan that Divan contribute
$20,000 to the Township as its share of improving the downstream conditions
of the stream that would carry drainage from the subdivision. 4 When Divan
challenged the requirement, the trial court entered judgment for Divan and
the appellate court affirmed.8 5
The question on appeal before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether
the planning board had the authority under the Municipal Planning Act of
1953 ("Planning Act") to require a developer to contribute to the cost of
an off-site improvement, even though the Planning Act did not expressly
authorize such exactions.8 6 The court reversed and held that the Planning
82. Id. at 587, 334 A.2d at 32.
83. Id. The ordinance provided in part that:
Prior to the granting of final approval of all subdivisions hereafter submitted to
the Planning Board, and prior to the issuance of any building permits for any land
use, including land uses which require site plan approval . . . and any residence or
other use of property on an unimproved street or where any off-site improvements
have not then been installed, the subdivider or other named type of applicant
shall have installed, posted a performance bond, or made cash payments, in the
manner provided in Section 5 below, with respect to the immediate or ultimate
installation of any required off-site improvements.
Id. at 588, 334 A.2d at 33 (citing WAYNE TowNsmp, N.J. ORDINANCE No. 69-1972, § 14-26(a)
(1975)).
84. Id. at 589, 334 A.2d at 33. The township then passed a bond ordinance authorizing the
construction of the drainage basin improvement project as a general improvement. Id. at 590,
334 A.2d at 33.
85. Id. at 591, 334 A.2d at 34. While the trial court upheld the township's right to require
off-site improvement, it entered judgment for Divan because the developer could not be required
to pay for improvements necessary to accommodate adjoining areas. Id. at 590, 334 A.2d at
34.
86. The court noted that the Planning Act authorized subdivision control and authorized
approval requirements by the planning board, specifically mentioning drainage as a category
of improvement, and empowering the municipality to impose particular improvements by
ordinance. The court cited the following section of the Planning Act as authority for imposing
specific improvements under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.21 (West 1974-75 & Supp. 1989):
Before final approval of plats the governing body may require, in accordance with
the standards adopted by ordinance, the installation, or the furnishing of a per-
formance guarantee in lieu thereof, of any or all of the following improvements it
may deem to be necessary or appropriate; street grading, pavement, gutters, curbs,
sidewalks, street lighting, shade trees, surveyor's monuments, water mains, culverts,
storm sewers, sanitary sewers or other means of sewage disposal, drainage structures,
and such other subdivision improvements as the municipal governing body may
find necessary in the public interest.
Id. at 594-95, 334 A.2d at 36 (emphasis supplied by court).
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Act authorized such improvements for two reasons. First, the state consti-
tution required a liberal construction of any law which concerns a municipal
corporation, and the Planning Act itself called for construction "most
favorably to municipalities." 's7 Second, the language of the Planning Act
empowered the municipality to condition subdivision approval on those
improvements which the local governing body found necessary for the pro-
tection of the public interest. According to the court, the public interest is
no less substantial in the case of an off-site exaction than on-site.8
Twelve years later, in New Jersey Builders Association v. Bernards Town-
ship, 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the question whether the
newly revised Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"), which succeeded the
Planning Act, authorized the Township to require new developers to pay
their pro rata share of a long-term, twenty-million dollar Township road
improvement plan. Bernards Township was a rapidly developing municipality
which had undertaken a comprehensive transportation and traffic study in
response to the impact of new and increased development in the county.9°
As a result of the study, a Transportation Management Plan was incorporated
into the Township's Master Plan and under the Master Plan the Township
adopted an ordinance which allocated the cost of long-term roadway im-
provements between the Township and its residential and commercial devel-
opers. 91 The premise underlying the ordinance was that all new development
contributes to the need for Township-wide road improvements. Thus, the
cost of improvements was allocated on a trip generation forecast 92 to reflect
the impact on existing development. 93
The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that subdivision and de-
velopment applications, in addition to their direct impact on municipal
facilities in the surrounding area, also have a cumulative and wide-ranging
impact on the entire community. 94 However, the court held that the MLUL
87. Id. at 595, 334 A.2d at 37 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.3 (West 1974-75 & Supp.
1989)). The Planning Act's intention was "to give all municipalities the fullest and most
complete powers possible concerning the subject matter hereof." Id.
88. Id. at 595, 334 A.2d at 37. The court went on to say that recognition that the expense
for such required improvement may be imposed upon the developer under the Planning Act
was only a preliminary step in determining whether a particular cost allocation was equitable.
In this case, since the improvement was constructed as a general improvement, the judgment
was reversed and the case remanded to trial court for a determination of the difference between
the cost of the improvement and the total amount by which all properties served were specially
benefited as a result. Id. at 604, 334 A.2d at 40-41.
89. 108 N.J. 223, 528 A.2d 555 (1987).
90. Id. at 224, 528 A.2d at 555.
91. Id. at 225-26, 528 A.2d at 556-57.
92. A trip generation forecast is a cost allocation formula which computes an average
number of vehicle arrivals and departures ("trips") of, for example, a single family residence
or professional office, based upon the number of residents or office occupants. Id. at 225, 528
A.2d at 556.
93. Id. at 225, 528 A.2d at 556.
94. Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 562.
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did not authorize the Township to impose the indirect capital costs of its
road improvement plan on new developers. The court said:
We cannot fault the logic or the foresight that induces a municipality such
as Bernards Township to consider the long-term impact of permitted
development on municipal resources and public facilities. But as yet the
Legislature has not delegated to municipalities the far-reaching power to
depart from traditionally authorized methods of financing public facilities
so as to allocate the cost of substantial public projects among new devel-
opments on the basis of their anticipated impact.91
The court based its decision on traditional rules of statutory construction,
including the "plain meaning" of the statute and its legislative purpose.9
The Township had argued that the MLUL empowered a planning agency to
require contribution to its overall road improvement plan because the MLUL
specifically authorized a developer "to pay his pro rata share of the cost of
providing only reasonable and necessary street improvements and water,
sewerage and drainage facilities, and easements therefor [sic], located outside
the property limits of the subdivision or development but necessitated or
required by construction or improvements within such subdivision or devel-
opment." 97
In response, the court said this statutory provision actually limited mu-
nicipal authority to those improvements required as a direct consequence of
the particular subdivision or development under review. 9 Even though the
New Jersey Constitution and the MLUL itself required that the provisions
of the MLUL be broadly construed in favor of municipal power,9 the court
charged the legislature with knowledge of prior judicial interpretations of
the Planning Act which had limited municipal authority under a "direct
consequence" test."° Because the state legislature failed to clearly and une-
quivocally depart from that judicial limitation of municipal power, the court
held that the legislature had not authorized the municipality to exercise
broader powers under this statute. The court's narrow interpretation of the
words "necessitated or required by construction" in the statute thus pre-
95. Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 562.
96. Id. The court stated:
We conclude that the plain meaning and obvious legislative intent was to limit
municipal authority only to improvements the need for which arose as a direct
consequence of the particular subdivision or development under review. The phrase
necessitated or required by construction ... within such subdivision or development
precludes the more expansive statutory interpretation urged upon us by counsel for
Bernards Township.
Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 562.
97. Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 562 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55 D-42 (West 1967 & Supp.
1989)).
98. Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 562.
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
100. New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Bernards Township, 108 N.J. 223, 236, 528 A.2d 555,
562 (1987).
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cluded pro rated fees imposed on developers in order to address the cumu-
lative long-term impact of development in the community. 10 1
In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court was unwilling to permit the
Township to develop new and innovative methods of financing public facil-
ities absent express statutory authority for doing so, despite the fact that
the MLUL instructed the court to construe liberally the law in favor of the
municipality. Rather, the court followed the traditional view that municipal
power should be narrowly construed, stating: "[hiad [the legislature's] intent
been to expand significantly municipal power to require contribution for
off-site improvements, we are confident that this intention would have been
manifested in the legislative history of the MLUL.'
10 2
In holding that Bernards Township lacked the statutory authority to impose
pro rated development fees for its long-term road improvement plan, the
court avoided the complex legal and policy issues involved in authorizing
"impact fee" type ordinances and their sustainable limits in this particular
case. In holding that such fees must be expressly authorized by the state
legislature before being imposed by the municipality, the court favored a
policy promoting uniformity and centralized authority under state-wide plan-
ning enabling legislation at the expense of a policy which would encourage
local autonomy and innovation.103
2. Exactions and Impact Fees Under Home Rule Authority
In the late nineteenth century, increased urbanization and the belief that
communities themselves are in the best position to understand and deal with
local problems led cities to seek some autonomy from state government
°4
Advocates of the movement for local autonomy, or "home rule," criticized
the narrowly drawn concept of municipal power under Dillon's Rule because
it failed to recognize local government's sophistication, its importance in the
political process, and the variety and complexity of issues it faces. 105
The home rule movement has met with some success. Today, most states
grant some home rule powers to municipalities within their jurisdictions.- 6
101. Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 562 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55 D-42 (West 1967 & Supp.
1989)).
102. Id. at 236, 528 A.2d at 562.
103. See Libonatti, supra note 75, at 68.
104. Note, Home Rule and the Pre-Emption Doctrine: The Relationship Between State and
Local Government in Maine, 37 ME. L. REV. 313, 323 (1985). The first successful result of
this movement was in 1875, when Missouri enacted a new constitution giving the city of St.
Louis the right to charter its own government. Id. at 324.
105. Libonatti, supra note 75, at 52. In 1982 there were 82,341 total types of government in
the United States. Of that total, 82,290 were described as local governments, either county,
municipal, township, school district, or special district. Id.
106. Larsen & Zimet, supra note 2, at 494. Simply defined, home rule is a grant of power
to the electorate of a local governmental unit. Politically, it means the freedom of a local unit
of government to pursue self-determined goals without interference from the state legislature
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The concept of home rule is a dynamic concept and is best viewed as a
flexible relationship permitting autonomy, interdependence and reciprocity
between state and local governments. 07 Grants of home rule authority gen-
erally are either constitutional or statutory, and may employ broad general
language or enumerate specific powers delegated to the municipality. 08 Under
an imperium in imperior model, there is a constitutionally mandated division
of responsibility between state and local government based on a distinction
between statewide and local matters, and a sphere of local affairs which are
beyond state legislative control.109 Under a "limitation approach" to home
rule, the municipality may fully exercise the state's police power unless a
state statute limits the power of the municipality to act." 0 The limitation
or other agencies of state government. See generally Libonatti, supra note 75, at 53; Note, The
Indiana Home Rule Act: A Second Chance for Local Self-Government, 16 IND. L. REV. 677
(1983) (home rule gives local governments authority to create solutions to individual problems
and to experiment with new approaches to effective government without first seeking state
authorization); Note, supra note 104, at 330 (home rule was designed to give city governments
power to offer flexible solutions to diverse problems).
107. Libonatti, supra note 75, at 53.
108. Note, supra note 106, at 683. For example, state constitutional amendments grant home
rule authority in Maine and Illinois. See Larsen & Zimet, supra note 2, at 494; Note, supra
note 104, at 338.
There are advantages and disadvantages with either a constitutional or statutory approach.
A statutory grant of home rule authority lacks the ability to place home rule powers beyond
legislative erosion, but permits greater responsiveness to change than a constitutional grant.
Note, supra note 106, at 683.
109. Note, supra note 104, at 325. The Missouri constitution of 1875 is generally credited
with creating this method for distributing a state's police power between state and local
government. Id. at 324 n.65.
110. Id. at 331. For example, IND. CODE § 36-1-3-4 (1981) provides:
(a) The rule of law that a unit has only:
(1) powers expressly granted by statute;
(2) powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to powers expressly granted;
and
(3) powers indispensable to the declared purposes of the unit;
is abrogated.
(b) A unit has:
(1) all powers granted it by statute; and
(2) all other powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs, even though
not granted by statute.
(c) The powers that units have under subsection (b)(l) are listed in various statutes.
However, these statutes do not list the powers that units have under subsection
(b)(2); therefore, the omission of a power from such a list does not imply that units
lack that power.
IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3-8 (Burns Supp. 1988) further provides:
A unit does not have the following:
(1) the power to condition or limit its civil liability, except as expressly granted by
statute.
(2) The power to prescribe the law governing civil actions between private persons.
(3) The power to impose duties on another political subdivision, except as expressly
granted by statute.
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approach essentially reverses Dillon's Rule that municipal government cannot
act unless a state statute or charter provision grants that power to act, and
converts a city's authority from a question of "why" into a question of
"why not?'''
Some states, such as California and Florida, have found authority for
exactions and development fees through broadly interpreted home rule pow-
ers in their state constitutions." 2 For example, in Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward
County, I" a developer challenged a county commission's authority under the
county charter to enact an ordinance requiring a dedication of land or in-
lieu fees for parks as a condition of subdivision approval. The court noted
that Broward County, as a Florida charter county, had broad home rule
powers." 4 Such power was limited only by preemption by the state govern-
ment or provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Finding nothing
in any state provision or charter that prohibited the county from enacting
such an ordinance, the court found the developer's ultra vires attack inef-
fective. "'
(4) The power to impose a tax, except as expressly granted by statute.
(5) The power to impose a license or other fee greater than that reasonably related
to the administrative cost of exercising a regulatory power.
(6) The power to impose a service charge or user fee greater than that reasonably
related to reasonable and just rates and charges for services as determined under
IC 8-1-25-2.
(7) The power to regulate conduct that is regulated by a state agency, except as
expressly granted by statute.
(8) The power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction
under statute.
(9) The power to prescribe a penalty of imprisonment for an ordinance violation.
(10) The power to prescribe a penalty of a fine of more than two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500) for an ordinance violation.
(11) The power to invest money, except as expressly granted by statute.
(12) The power to order or conduct an election, except as expressly granted by
statute.
111. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA L. REV.
671, 678 (1973).
112. See, e.g., J.W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 757, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 580, 588 (1984) (authority to finance public improvements through assessment procedures
conferred under art. XI, sec. 5 of the California Constitution); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward
Co., 431 So. 2d 606, 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (power to require dedication of land or
in-lieu fee conferred through art. VIII, sec. 1(g) of the Florida Constitution).
113. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
114. Id. at 609. Florida charter counties, such as Broward County, derive their sovereign
powers from article VIII, section 1(g) of the Florida Constitution which provides in part:
Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-
government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by the
vote of the electors. The governing body of a county operating under a charter
may enact county ordinances not inconsistent with general law.
Id. at 608.
115. Id. at 610. As a result, the court found it unnecessary to address the county's argument
that it was empowered to enact the ordinance by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning
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Other states have taken a narrow view of home rule enabling legislation
and invalidated impact fees not expressly authorized by a state statute or
constitutional provision. Recently, in Albany Area Builders v. Guilderland,"6
the town of Guilderland in Albany County, New York, adopted a local law
called the Transportation Impact Fee Law (TIFL) requiring all applicants
for building permits for land improvements, which would generate additional
traffic, to pay a transportation impact fee at the time the permit was issued." 7
The amount of the fee was determined by a schedule in the law. TIFL also
established a Transportation Impact Fee Trust Fund and provided that the
funds were to be used for capital improvements to and expansion of the
town, county and state roadway network and transportation facilities within
the town. Funds were not to be used for periodic or routine maintenance." 8
The Albany Area Builders Association and other developers challenged the
town's authority to enact such a law, contending that the New York Mu-
nicipal Home Rule Law, which permits local governments to adopt laws
relating generally to their own "property, affairs, or government," did not
permit local legislation in matters of substantial state concern. The Supreme
Court Appellate Division agreed, explaining that local statutes are within
constitutional home rule provisions when such legislation affects only the
property, affairs, or government of the municipality involved. The court
continued:
In the case at hand, it can hardly be disputed that TIFL has effects which
go beyond the Town's boundaries. The imposition of a transportation
impact fee certainly will inhibit new construction, particularly low-income
housing, within the Town's boundaries and will thereby shift new devel-
opment to surrounding localities."19
The court decided that other provisions of the Home Rule Law which
permitted local laws relating to the acquisition of transit facilities, or ac-
quisition, care, management and use of highways and roads, did not permit
a municipality to create new taxes to fund highway improvements. The court
found TIFL inconsistent with and preempted by general state laws regulating
highway funding and municipal finance. 20
Act. Id. at 610 n.3. Applying a rational nexus test, the court went on to hold that subdivision
exactions for county level parks are permissible so long as the exactions are shown to offset,
but not exceed, reasonable needs sufficiently attributable to the new subdivision residents and
the funds collected are adequately earmarked for the acquisition of capital assets that will
sufficiently benefit those new residents. Under this test, the court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court which had concluded that the Broward County ordinance was valid. Id. at 614.
116. 141 A.D.2d 293, 534 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1988), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547
N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989).
117. Id. at 295, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 296-97, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
120. Id. at 299, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 795. The court said, "[tlhe means by which revenues are
raised and expended for the purpose of improving transportation facilities are the subject of a
comprehensive regulation by the legislature, primarily codified in Town Law article 8." Id. at
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One can view the appellate court's decision in Albany Area Builders as a
case illustrating the inherent limitation of state home rule legislation which
confers upon local governments only the power to adopt local laws dealing
with local concerns. In an increasingly complex and interdependent world,
it is difficult to think of many issues which are solely of local concern and
do not go beyond the boundaries of a municipality. This is especially true
if local planning and development decisions are held to encompass matters
of substantial state concern because they might inhibit construction or shift
new development to surrounding localities. In most, if not all, cases, a
restrictive planning or zoning decision or exaction requirement might have
such an effect.
As the appellate court opinion in Albany Area Builders also illustrates,
even in home rule states, courts often exhibit the tendency to strike a middle
of the road course when balancing the powers of state and local governments
and often uphold the interests of the state and the individual over those of
the municipality. 2 ' These courts appear reluctant to permit what they see as
radical or innovative local financing initiatives by local government. Others
zealously protect private property rights from what they see as encroachment
by municipalities and other governmental entities under the guise of pro-
tecting the public safety, health, and general welfare. 122 This judicial reluc-
tance may in part be founded in the historical entrenchment of Dillon's rule
which sees limits on city power as "natural," and the court's role to construe
narrowly such power. Thus, even under home rule, where local self-deter-
mination is limited to matters "purely local" in nature, many states still
treat cities as mere creatures of the state.
3. The Exaction Requirement: Fee or Tax?
Courts frequently address the legality of an in-lieu fee or impact fee by
determining whether the ordinance imposes a "regulatory fee" or whether
the fee actually constitutes a "tax." In such cases, the label is usually
outcome-determinative. Once a court labels the fee a "tax," it will be
invalidated unless there is express enabling legislation for imposing such a
tax, and this rarely exists. 23
299-300, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
In October 1989, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court's decision,
finding that the state had preempted the field of highway funding by regulating how roadway
improvements are budgeted, financed and how funds are to be expended. 74 N.Y.2d 372, 374,
546 N.E.2d 920, 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (1989).
121. Libonatti, supra note 75, at 68.
122. See Berg Dev. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980)
(district court found unconstitutional an ordinance requiring developers to dedicate sites within
a subdivision for public park purposes and which permitted the city to require a cash payment
of the market value of the realty instead of the dedication of the realty itself).
123. See Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 104-05, 359 P.2d 108, 110-11 (1961) (court noting
that exaction could either be a permissible regulatory device or impermissible revenue raising
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The distinction between a fee and a tax turns on a determination of the
primary purpose of the legislation. If the primary purpose of legislation is
regulation rather than raising revenue, the fee is not a tax. If, on the other
hand, the primary purpose of the legislation is to raise money, the fees are
not regulatory but fiscal, and they are taxes.' 24 One court called such labeling
merely an "exercise in semantics" because an ordinance which raises revenue,
if reasonably designed and carried out for its intended purpose, is a proper
form of planning for the good of the community, and therefore not prohib-
ited as a tax. 125 The distinction between a fee and a tax has been criticized
as a mere "formalism,"' ' 26 and as begging the question of public policy.127
Nevertheless, the choice the court makes is critical because a fee construed
as a police power regulation requires only very broad legislative delegation,'28
while a tax requires specific statutory authorization.' 29
device, found language in statutory provision indicating that the purpose of statute was to raise
revenue, and therefore struck down statute); Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah
1982) (noting that a charge for specific service would be permissible, but found impact fee to
be an impermissible general fee); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804,
809-10, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (1982) (same).
124. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 104-05, 359 P.2d 108, 110-11 (1961) (exaction could
be either a permissible regulatory device or impermissible revenue raising device based upon
the purpose of the statute); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 809,
650 P.2d 193, 195 (1982) (primary purpose of the ordinance will determine whether ordinance
was a regulation or a tax); Miller v. City of Port Angeles, 38 Wash. App. 904, 910, 691 P.2d
229, 234 (1984) (where fees are intended primarily to regulate the development or a specific
subdivision and not simply to raise revenue, they will not be considered taxes).
125. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220-221 (Utah 1979). The Call court, in
discussing the labeling of the ordinance as a taxing instrument or regulating instrument, stated:
"this labeling is but an exercise in semantics which misconstrues the purpose of the ordinance
to make another attack upon it." Id.
126. Fischel, supra note 9, at 106.
127. See generally Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 423-24 (stating that "most courts
have summarily labeled extradevelopment impact fees as either a tax or regulation in a result-
oriented fashion that avoids an adequate theoretical or policy-directed explanation").
128. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 317-20 (Fla.
1976) (if fee is characterized as tax, then it is void for lack of specific statutory authorization,
but because it is a regulation, the broader delegation will suffice), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 667
(1979); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish Co., 97 Wash. 2d at 807, 650 P.2d at 195 (noting
that the subject fees were not regulatory, and therefore were not authorized by the broad police
power "encompassing all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to
promotion of the general welfare of the people") (quoting State v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 162,
165, 615 P.2d 461, 463 (1980)).
A court may also look to the presence of specific enabling legislation and home rule powers
in determining whether such development fees are permitted under general police powers. Jordan
v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 612, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
129. See City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363, 365 (Ala. 1978) (held
that in-lieu fee was a tax and required specific statutory authorization); Lafferty v. Payson
City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982) (same); Citizens for a Financially Responsible Gov't. v.
Spokane, 99 Wash. 2d 339, 343, 662 P.2d 845, 848 (1983) (municipality requires specific
legislative authority to levy taxes).
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Most local governments which utilize development impact fees to finance
capital improvements must rely on their general police powers, rather than
taxing powers authorized by the state. This is so because in most states there
is no legislation specifically authorizing such fees. 30 As a result, the city
must take the position that it has the authority to levy such fees under its
general police powers. 3 '
Whether imposing such fees is permitted under local police powers as a
regulatory fee rather than a tax requires a determination based on such
factors as the presence of specific enabling legislation, home rule powers,
and whether that power is necessarily implied from any general statutory
grant of power. In most cases where the requirement is construed as a
regulatory fee rather than a tax, the payment is upheld as a valid exercise
of the police power;'3 2 if it is construed as a tax, it is almost always invalid. '33
For example, in Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County,'34 developers
challenged local ordinances which imposed fees on new residential subdivi-
sions and housing proposals in two Washington counties. The counties
adopted the ordinances in response to financial pressures caused by rapid
residential growth and authorized imposing the fees on new subdivisions for
parks, schools, roads, and fire protection. The fees were to be deposited in
special accounts to benefit the geographic area from which the payment was
made. '
The Washington Supreme Court held that the payments the developers
paid in order to receive final approval of their projects were not fees but
actually taxes. Although the state constitution delegated broad power to each
county to make and enforce local police, sanitary, and other regulations not
in conflict with general laws, the extensive police power of the counties did
130. Nicholas, supra note 1, at 88. A few states, such as California, however, have passed
legislation authorizing impact fees. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65970-65979 (West Supp. 1989).
131. Police powers, including the power to regulate land development, are delegated to local
governments by the states, but the extent to which governments may exercise those powers
varies. Nicholas, supra note 1, at 86.
132. See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 320 (Fla.
1976) (impact fee a regulation, valid if proper limitations placed on amount collected), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 876 (1979); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25,
33-36, 394 P.2d 182, 188 (1964) (same); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 82,
218 N.E.2d 673, 674, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (1966) (in-lieu fee is a regulation and is permissible
under municipality's police power).
133. E.g., Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982) (striking down a city
ordinance requiring the payment of an "impact fee" of $1,000 per family dwelling prior to the
issuance of any building permit). The court reaffirmed the distinction between a fee imposed
to finance a specific municipal service or capital expenditure, and a fee which was deposited
into the city's general fund. The court held that a reasonable charge for a specific service is
permissible, whereas a general fee that amounts to a revenue measure is not. Id.
134. 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982).
135. Id. at 806, 650 P.2d at 194. The use of the fees was restricted to capital improvements,
such as solid waste disposal facilities, parks, roads, and sheriff's services. Id.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
not include the power to tax. 136 Although not all demands for payment by
a governmental body are taxes, the court decided that if the primary purpose
of legislation is regulation rather than raising revenue, it is not a tax, but if
the primary purpose of the fees is to raise money, the fees are fiscal and
thus taxes. Because both ordinances provided that the fees were to be used
to offset the costs of providing specified services, and neither made any
provision for regulating residential developments, the primary purpose of
the ordinances was to raise revenue and thus to tax. Therefore, without
express authority to impose taxes in the form of development fees, the
ordinances were invalid. 137
In cases like Hillis Homes, a court must balance the policies favoring local
government flexibility in land use planning against policies restricting local
government exaction requirements. The Florida Supreme Court recognized
these policy concerns as such in Contractors & Builders Association v. City
of Dunedin. 138 In Dunedin, building contractors and land owners challenged
a municipal ordinance which required payment of impact fees for capital
improvements upon the issuance of a building permit. The developers argued
that the fees constituted taxes which the municipality was forbidden to
impose in the absence of enabling legislation. The Florida Supreme Court
disagreed and held that a city could raise money to expand its water and
sewerage system to meet the increased demand of additional connections by
imposing impact fees, despite the fact that no express statutory provision
governed capital acquisition other than deficit financing. In explaining its
decision, the court said:
We see no reason to require that a municipality resort to deficit financing,
in order to raise capital by means of utility rates and charges. On the
contrary, sound public policy militates against any such inflexibility. It
may be a simpler technical task to amortize a known outlay, than to
predict population trends and the other variables necessary to arrive at an
accurate forecast of future capital needs. But raising capital for future use
by means of rates and charges may permit a municipality to take advantage
of favorable conditions, which would alter before money could be raised
through issuance of debt securities; and the day may not be far distant
when municipalities cannot compete successfully with other borrowers for
needed capital.-
136. Id. The court recognized that a county's police powers are extensive:
Municipal police power is as extensive as that of the legislature, so long as the
subject matter is local and the regulation does not conflict with general laws ....
The scope of police power is broad, encompassing all those measures which bear a
reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the
people.
Id. at 808, 650 P.2d at 195 (citing State v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461, 463
(1980)).
137. Id. at 810, 650 P.2d at 196.
138. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
139. Id. at 319-20.
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4. Implied Authority Under General Police Powers
Because it is impractical for a legislature to spell out all the things that
city governments must do to perform their functions, enabling statutes
frequently grant cities broad authority to promote the public safety and
welfare under their general police powers. The police power is a flexible
concept which develops and grows to meet changing conditions, and it
includes the power to reasonably regulate for the public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, and law and order. '4° Some courts have found
that a municipality is authorized to impose subdivision exactions under its
general police powers because the orderly development of a municipality
must necessarily include the present and future need for such things as
streets, sewers, schools, and public recreational facilities. 141
For example, in Call v. City of West Jordan,'4 developers challenged a
city ordinance requiring them to dedicate seven percent of their land to the
city, or pay a fee in-lieu thereof, to be used for flood control or park and
recreation facilities or both. The developers argued, among other things,
that the ordinance was invalid because the city lacked the power to require
such a fee. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the ordinance
was within the scope of authority and responsibility of the city in promoting
the "health, safety, morals and general welfare" of the community under a
140. The police power is elastic and capable of expansion to meet existing conditions of
modern life and to keep pace with the social, economic, moral and intellectual evolution of
the human race. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925).
Under the authority of police powers a state may regulate activities which pose a threat or
hindrance to the public safety, health, or morals. See Bayou Cane Volunteer Fire Dept. v.
Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, 548 So. 2d 915, 918 (La. 1989) (state may permit local
authorities to create independent fire protection districts); State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 912,
448 N.W.2d 595, 597-98 (1989) (state may reasonably regulate the use of weapons); Cima v.
Elliot, 224 N.J. Super. 436, 439-40, 540 A.2d 918, 919 (1988) (state may enact statute which
allows an owner of a rental unit to summarily evict a tenant when the owner seeks to personally
occupy the unit); State v. Batsch, 44 Ohio App. 3d 81, 82, 541 N.E.2d 475, 476 (1988) (state
may require automobile drivers to wear safety belt); Nuttall v. Nuttall, 562 A.2d 841, 845 (Pa.
Super. 1989) (state may enact statute which provides for a mandatory equitable distribution of
marital property subsequent to divorce); Blanco v. State, 761 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. App. 1988)
(state may protect the tranquility, quiet enjoyment, and well-being of a community from
unreasonable noise in a public place or near a private residence).
141. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 29, 394 P.2d 182, 187
(1964). See also Bayswater Realty Capital Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Lewisbaro, 149 A.D.2d
49, 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d 613, 616 (1989) (planning board possessed authority to require, as condition
to subdivision plat approval, in-lieu fee for park, playground, or other recreational purpose);
Tekoa Constr., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 56 Wash. App. 28, 36-37, 781 P.2d 1324, 1327-28 (1989)
(city could regulate and restrict location, use, and construction of buildings and land to promote
public health, safety or welfare). But see Joseph v. Planning Bd. of Yorktown, 140 A.D.2d
670, 671, 529 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1988) (town's authority to require payment of money in lieu
of land for recreational purposes may not be exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner).
142. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
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state statute. 43 The court held that planning for adequate parks and play-
grounds was desirable and essential under this authority, stating:
In modern times of ever-increasing population and congestion, real estate
developers buy land at high prices. From the combined pressures of
competition and desire for gain, they often squeeze every lot they can into
some labyrinthine plan, with only the barest minimum for tortious and
circuitous streets, without any arterial ways through such subdivisions, and
with little or no provision for parks, recreation areas, or even for reason-
able "elbow room." The need for some general planning and control is
apparent, and makes manifest the wisdom underlying the delegation of
powers to the cities, as is done in the statutes above referred to.'"
The court dismissed the argument that the ordinance was revenue-raising
and thus a tax, because it found the ordinance was a proper planning
ordinance and necessary for the good of the community. Similarly, there
was no compensable taking under the city's power of eminent domain,
because the regulations on subdivision approval were reasonable.' 4
The general power to control land use for health, safety, and general
welfare of the public, however, does not authorize a municipality to act in
a manner which is arbitrary or unreasonable. A court should balance the
interests in granting a municipality flexibility under its broad police powers
to impose reasonable requirements with the need to limit that authority to
prevent "free-wheeling" exactions by local authorities. The problem is illus-
trated in a recent New Jersey case, Nunziato v. Edgewater Planning Board, 146
where the plaintiffs challenged a planning board's grant of site plan approval
for construction of a high-rise condominium apartment building. The de-
veloper had agreed to contribute $203,000 for affordable housing in the
town as an "unconditional gift," and did not object to doing so.147 The idea
of such a contribution was first proposed by the board chairman who said
he was "sure" that it would be considered by the board in connection with
the application. 4 Even though the board maintained throughout the pro-
ceedings that the amount contributed would have no bearing on its decision,
the appellate court disagreed, finding the developer's promise to pay $203,000
was a material factor in the application process. 49 The court believed the
143. Id. at 219. Utah law provided that "[flor the purpose of promoting health, safety,
morals and the general welfare of the community the legislative body of cities and towns is
empowered to regulate and restrict . . .the location and use of buildings, structures and land
for trade, industry, residence or other purposes." Id. Furthermore, a section of the state's
Municipal Planning Enabling Act granted a planning commission "such powers as may be
necessary to enable it to perform its functions and promote municipal planning." Id.
144. Id. at 219.
145. Id. at 220 (stating that "as a prerequisite for permitting the creation of the subdivision,
the City, under the powers conferred upon it, can and does impose reasonable regulations").
146. 225 N.J. Super. 124, 541 A.2d 1105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
147. Id. at 134, 541 A.2d at 1110.
148. Id. at 133, 541 A.2d at 1110.
149. Id.
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bidding process was "grossly inimical to the goals of sound land use regu-
lation," and "the intolerable spectacle of a planning board haggling with
an applicant over money too strongly suggests that variances are up for
sale.''' 5 0
In Nunziato, the court found the local planning board's action to be
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and vacated the action on that basis.
The court also expressed its concern that without legislated standards the
possibilities for abuse in such negotiations between an applicant and a
regulatory body, no matter how worthy the cause, were unlimited. 5 Al-
though agreeing that state and municipal bodies have the power to control
land use for the health, safety, and general welfare of the public, the court
left open the question of whether this power authorizes municipalities to
solicit and accept money as in the present case.1 2 But because the municipality
had not enacted an ordinance which authorized such solicitation, the exaction
was held to be invalid. 5 3
As Nunziato illustrates, even if the municipality has the power to condition
plat approval on a particular exaction requirement, the municipality may
not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner in exercising that power. In
addition, any exercise of police power by a municipality must be reasonable.
It is on this basis-the requirement that an exaction or fee be reasonable-
that the constitutionality of impact fee ordinances and off-site municipal
exactions are most frequently challenged. 5 4
B. Constitutional Issues: The Reasonableness Tests
The due process clauses of the United States Constitution's fifth and
fourteenth amendments 5 require that any exercise of a state's police power
150. Nunziato v. Edgewater Planning Bd., 225 N.J. Super. at 134, 541 A.2d at 1110.
151. Id. at 133, 541 A.2d at 1110.
152. Id. at 132, 541 A.2d at 1109.
153. Nunziato v. Edgewater Planning Bd., 225 N.J. Super. at 132, 541 A.2d at 1109. The
court stated that:
Whether [police power] authorizes a municipality to provide for the solicitation and
acceptance of money in the manner that was done here is a question we do not
decide. Assuming that it does provide such authority, it is clear that an implementing
ordinance was never enacted and without that the exaction is impermissible.
Id.
154. See Smith, supra note 9, at 11. For a general discussion of the requirement of "rea-
sonableness," see Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
155. The fifth amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that "[n1o State shall . . .deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Substantive due process is a standard that has effectively limited land use control for over
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must be reasonably related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental
objective. 5 6 If reasonable, a municipal exaction is a valid exercise of the
police power. If unreasonable and onerous, it fails as an improper exercise
of the police power and gives rise to the claim that it is an unconstitutional
taking.'57
Until recently, the Supreme Court has interpreted the takings clause of
the fifth amendment, which guarantees that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation, to require judicial deference
to local government decisions concerning land use.5 8 The states in turn have
developed divergent tests to determine whether an exaction requirement or
fee was a reasonable exercise of the state and local police power. These tests
range from standards which give great deference to local government deci-
sions to more stringent requirements which impose tests almost impossible
to satisfy.5 9 State courts have used at least three different tests to determine
whether an exaction or impact fee is a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power. Generally, each test is employed without distinction between
fifty years. It requires that government powers affecting private rights and interests be exercised
in a fundamentally fair fashion, and the traditional test is whether the regulation bears a
"substantial relationship" to the public purpose. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926). See generally Larsen & Zimet, supra note 9, at 493 n.17.
156. The requirement of reasonableness under the due process clauses of the United States
Constitution defines the rights of the individual and limits the powers which the state may
exercise. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967). Reasonableness is not an absolute concept but
depends on the circumstances of each case. The inquiry focuses on the relationship between
the regulation and the needs generated by the proposed development. Delaney, Gordon & Hess,
supra note 9, at 147.
There may be many factors which a court should consider in determining the relative burden
borne by newly developed properties and other properties. In the case of impact fees, such
factors include: (1) the cost of existing capital facilities; (2) the means by which those facilities
have been financed; (3) the extent to which the properties being charged the new fees have
already contributed to the cost of the existing facilities; (4) the extent to which they will
contribute to the cost of existing capital facilities in the future; (5) the extent to which they
should be credited for providing common facilities that the municipality has provided without
charge to other properties in its service area; (6) extraordinary costs, if any, in serving the new
property; and, (7) the time-price differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts paid at
different times. See Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981).
157. Pavelko, supra note 9, at 282. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the
traditional tests for whether a land use control is a taking requiring compensation or a regulation
which requires nothing are changing. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct.
3141 (1987), by a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court defined new standards which appear less
deferential to state and local governments than many existing standards. See infra notes 172-
77 and accompanying text.
158. See Note, supra note 31, at 641.
159. If, for example, the words "specifically and uniquely attributable" in a particular test
mean that the municipality must prove that the land to be dedicated for a park or school site
is necessary to meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into the
community to occupy that particular subdivision, then it would be impossible for the munici-
pality to satisfy such a requirement in most instances. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,
28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
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traditional exactions and the more innovative and controversial user impact
fees. 160
1. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Test
The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test places an almost insur-
mountable burden on local governments seeking capital development pay-
ments from developers as a condition of development approval. 6' This test,
first articulated in a 1961 Illinois case, 62 requires a subdivision developer to
assume only those costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable to
the development. 63 As a result, where capital facilities such as schools are
overcrowded because of cumulative development in the community, a de-
veloper can not be required to fund new facilities because the need for such
is not specifically and uniquely attributable to the new development.164 The
test is based on the principle of special assessment, which serves as an
alternative form of exaction in many states. 65 A minority of states, including
160. Some writers have argued that a different degree of burden on the municipality should
exist based on the type of exaction involved, and the courts should distinguish between traditional
exactions and user impact fees. See Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 9, at 145. There are
also different variations on these tests such as the "judicial deference" test used in Montana,
and the "direct benefit test" based on the doctrine of special assessments. Id. at 154-55.
The "judicial deference" test, created by the Montana Supreme Court in Billings Properties,
Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964), provides for automatic
acceptance of a legislative determination in favor of an exaction, unless the developer produces
evidence demonstrating that the exaction was unreasonable. Id. at 35-36, 394 P.2d at 188. The
"direct benefit" test, set forth in Gulest Assoc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209
N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960), requires a showing that the regulation would directly
benefit the subdivision. Id. at 1007-08, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 733. The direct benefit test is based
on the special assessment doctrine, a tax law principle that provides that the costs of a service
or improvement performed by the local government may be levied against real property if the
benefits of the improvement will accrue directly to the assessed property. See Delaney, Gordon
& Hess, supra note 9, at 154-56.
161. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 427.
162. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961).
163. Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802. The Pioneer court stated:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality and
if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to
his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts
to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohi-
bitions rather than reasonable regulation under the police power.
Id.
164. In Pioneer, the developer submitted a subdivision plat for approval of 250 residential
units to the village planning commission. The planning commission, pursuant to ordinance,
had required dedication of 6.7 acres of land for an elementary school and playground. Id. at
378, 176 N.E.2d at 801. The court found that this ordinance requirement imposed an unrea-
sonable condition precedent for approval of the plat, and thus constituted a taking of private
property for public use without compensation. Id. at 382, 176 N.E.2d at 803.
165. Special assessments are charges used to finance municipal development which are levied
against surrounding real property which is directly benefitted by the local improvement. Smith,
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Illinois, follow this test, but the majority have rejected it because it appears
impossible for the municipality to meet's6 and prohibits a municipality from
addressing the cumulative strain on a city's infrastructure as a result of new
smaller developments.
16 7
2. The "Reasonable Relationship" Test
Almost diametrically opposed to the specifically and uniquely attributable
test is the "reasonable relationship" test, which some have called the "any-
thing goes" test. 6 This test exerts a strong presumption in favor of the
municipality, and requires the municipality only to show that the amount
and location of land or fees bear some reasonable relationship to the use of
the facilities by the future inhabitants of the subdivision. 69 In 1949, Cali-
fornia first adopted the flexible reasonable relationship test in Ayres v. City
Council of Los Angeles,170 when it held that a subdivider who seeks to
acquire the advantages of development has a duty to comply with reasonable
conditions for dedication.'71
supra note 9, at 19-24; Taub, supra note 9, at 522-24 Special assessments, however, cannot be
used to finance facilities which benefit the general public, and municipalities may only assess
the property owner for the cost of such facilities in proportion to the benefits he receives from
such facilities. Taub, supra note 9, at 523. For example, if a municipality wishes to construct
new curbs and drainage facilities throughout a residential area, the houses directly benefitted
by the curbs may be charged with a special assessment, but only in proportion to the benefit
the property receives by having the curbs. Smith, supra note 9, at 19-20. In most states special
assessments must be explicitly authorized by statute or state constitution, and without such
authorization they are treated as an illegal tax. Taub, supra note 9, at 523.
However, there is a recent trend to liberalize the definition of "special assessment," and in
California the courts have recently held that a fixed benefit assessment is not a tax despite the
lack of any statutory or constitutional authority. E.g., Jones v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal.
App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984).
166. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447
(1965) (specifically and uniquely attributable test should not be restrictively applied so that it
puts an insurmountable burden upon the municipality), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
167. Conners & High, supra note 9, at 76.
168. Taub, supra note 9, at 528.
169. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606,
94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). The California Supreme Court stated:
We see no persuasive reason in the fact of these urgent needs caused by present
and anticipated future population growth on the one hand and the disappearance
of open land on the other to hold that a statute requiring the dedication of land
by a subdivider may be justified only upon the ground that the particular subdivider
upon whom an exaction has been imposed will, solely by the development of his
subdivision, increase the need for recreational facilities to such an extent that
additional land for such facilities will be required.
Id. at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
170. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1, (1949).
171. Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 7. The leading California case on the constitutionality of exactions
is Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1971). In that case, the California Supreme Court upheld a statute which granted
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission172 raises doubts about the current validity of this test. In Nollan,
the California Coastal Commission granted a permit to the Nollans to replace
a bungalow on their beachfront lot with a house, on the condition that they
grant the public an easement to cross a portion of their property, which was
located between two public beaches. The house was to be a three bedroom
house, keeping up with the residential buildings along the coastline. The
commission argued that the Nollans were adding to a "wall" of residential
structures preventing the public's ability to see the ocean, and that the
construction of the house, along with other developments, was burdening
the public's ability to use the shorefront. They argued that assisting the
public in overcoming the "psychological barrier" to using the public beach,
and preventing congestion on the public beaches was a legitimate public
purpose. The Court assumed for purposes of argument that this was true.171
However, a majority of the Court found that the commission's imposition
of the permit condition constituted an unconstitutional taking because the
condition imposed did not serve the public purposes related to the permit
requirement. The court, by a 5-4 majority, found the permit was an improper
land use regulation, because there was no direct, or even rational, relationship
between the public's ability to see the ocean and securing an easement for
the public to walk on the beach.'7 4
municipalities the power to require dedications of land or payment of in-lieu fees for park and
recreational purposes as a condition precedent to subdivision approval. Id. at 648, 484 P.2d at
618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
In Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985),
the California Court of Appeals held that so long as a project contributed to the need for
public access, even if the project standing alone had not created the need for access, and even
if there was only an indirect relationship between the access exacted and the need to which the
project contributed, the imposition of an access condition on a development permit was
sufficiently related to burdens created by the project to be constitutional. Id. at 167, 212 Cal.
Rptr. at 589-90.
172. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For a discussion of the impact of this and other recent decisions
on land use regulation, see Berger, supra note 58, at 736; Brooks, supra note 76, at 141;
Callies, Property Rights: Are There Any Left?, 20 UR. LAW. 597 (1988); Peterson, Recent
Developments in "Takings" Jurisprudence-Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The
New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 335 (1988); Note, supra note 31, at 641;
Note, Eminent Domain: Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Analysis. How Does Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission Fit In?, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 547 (1988).
173. 483 U.S. at 835.
174. Id. at 838-39. The dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall contains this strong criticism
of the majority test of rationality:
The Nollan's development blocks visual access, the Court tells us, while the Com-
mission seeks to preserve the lateral access along the coastline. Thus, it concludes,
the State acted irrationally. Such a narrow conception of rationality, however, has
long since been discredited as a judicial arrogation of legislative authority. "To
make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power would be to subject the
State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Govern-
ment."
Id. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)).
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Prior to Nollan, some commentators had criticized the reasonable rela-
tionship test as permitting exactions to become "judicially sanctioned extor-
tion," because under a generous definition of reasonable relationship,
municipalities have almost unlimited discretion to impose development ex-
actions. 71 The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan has clearly tightened the
requirements of permissible regulation by indicating increased scrutiny of
governmental actions in land use decisions and by requiring that there be
an "essential nexus" between the need for the exaction and the develop-
ment. 76 As a result, the reasonable relationship test, employing a standard
extremely deferential to local governments, may no longer be good law. 77
3. The "Rational Nexus" Test
A majority of states today employ a third test, the "rational nexus" test,
first adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls. 178 This test adopts a more moderate standard for reviewing
exactions. It retains a presumption of validity in favor of the municipality,
but it is similar to the specifically and uniquely attributable test in that it
requires there be a reasonable connection between the exaction and the needs
created by or benefits conferred upon the new development. 79 Under a
rational nexus test, an exaction is not unreasonable simply because the general
public might also benefit from the improvement. However, a developer can
be required to bear only that portion of the cost of an improvement that
bears a rational nexus to the needs created by or special benefits conferred
upon the development. 80
The rational nexus test has been considered the best framework for
addressing the validity of an exaction scheme because it considers the needs
of the community and is at the same time fair to the developer.' The
reasonable relationship test gives unlimited discretion to the municipality,
and the uniquely attributable test shifts an insurmountable burden of proof
to the municipality. The rational nexus test, on the other hand, requires only
that the municipality show that the residents of the development would
receive benefits in reasonable proportion to their contribution to the facility's
construction.8 2 The test thus ties the developer's contribution to the costs
that are attributable to the development but also permits the municipality
to address .the problems of cumulative growth.
175. Smith, supra note 9, at 13.
176. Berger, supra note 58, at 751.
177. Brooks, supra note 76, at 163.
178. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
179. Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 9, at 152.
180. Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977);
Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1974); Delaney, Gordon
& Hess, supra note 9, at 153.
181. Conners & High, supra note 9, at 77.
182. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 23 Wis. 2d 608, 619-20, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
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The effect of the recent Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission"3 on the rational nexus test is somewhat uncertain.
Some writers have suggested that the decision decreases the amount of
deference courts can grant municipalities under a rational nexus test, and
that the flexibility this test allows for considering future needs may undermine
its own validity under the Court's "essential nexus" standard.1 4 Others view
Nollan as a decision where the Supreme Court actually adopted the rational
nexus test for exactions, in-lieu fees, and impact fees over the broader
California reasonable relationship test.' 5 In any event, after Nollan, courts
employing a rational nexus or reasonable relationship test will likely tighten
the standards by which they examine the validity of land use regulations in
general.
III. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS UNDER AN
ULTRA VIRES ATTACK
In most cases, the threshold question raised by those who challenge
municipal exactions is not whether the required payment was reasonable,
but whether the municipal action was authorized by state statute or consti-
tutional provision. 8 6 In addressing the ultra vires issue, courts should weigh
the policies favoring municipal autonomy against the policies underlying
traditional limitations on municipal power. The traditional view that the
power of local government to legislate should be narrowly construed by the
courts conflicts with the policies underlying the movement toward local
autonomy and home rule for the nation's municipalities.
The principle of local autonomy is a fundamental principle of American
democracy, and the history of American thought supports the belief that
decentralized political systems are better than centralized., 7 Advocates of
local autonomy believe local government is the most politically responsive
branch of government, and thus the best level at which to implement policy. 8
183. See supra notes 172-77, and accompanying text.
184. Brooks, supra note 76 at 162-63.
185. Callies, supra note 172, at 639.
186. The ultra vires challenge is the primary attack because if the municipality has exceeded
its authority, then there is no need to investigate the reasonableness of its actions. See Call v.
City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (in-lieu fees for flood control, park, and
recreational purposes attacked primarily as ultra vires, secondarily as an unreasonable regula-
tion). See also Heym & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs
on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1134 n.66
(1964) (listing of cases where issue of statutory authority was dispositive); Juergensmeyer &
Blake, supra note 9, at 421.
187. See G. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES 195 (1985) (believing that one foundation of
historical American social thought is local authority).
188. Id. at 20 (discussing how noted political theorists Manuel Castells, J.J. Mansbridge,
David Miller, and Robert Nozick, while having different societal views, "all would agree that
local democracy enables change, ponders social cohesion, and provides a way of facilitating
the voice of the people," and indicating that all would agree that "local autonomy and
decentralized democracy are good from many different perspectives") (emphasis added).
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They believe decentralized political systems are the best way to protect
individual freedom, and recognize the importance of vesting certain regula-
tory powers to those at the local level who are especially competent to
address local concerns.8 9 The policies that justify administrative agencies
also support local government autonomy. Local government provides a
mechanism for continuous, often expert supervision of local programs and
facilities, permits local officials with special knowledge to address specialized
needs in the community, and relieves state legislatures from the day-to-day
responsibilities of local management.
There are, of course, legitimate concerns about the extent to which local
government decisionmaking should be free from state and federal control.' 9°
Despite such concerns, however, it is fair to say that principles of local
autonomy and the home rule movement have become an integral part of
our social and political thinking today.' 9' Local autonomy is especially
appropriate where decisions involve local planning, zoning, and development
issues, because addressing these issues necessarily involves the accommoda-
tion of various and competing local interests which a state legislative process
may fail to adequately represent. 92
In cases challenging municipal authority to impose development fees or
exactions as ultra vires, courts not only resolve disputes, they also provide
determinate interpretations of the limits of municipal power. In that role,
courts have great discretion in interpreting state enabling legislation because
that legislation is usually broadly conceived. 93 In addition, state-level legis-
lation which details the scope of local government power is often ambiguous
because general legislation frequently treats specific local governments ac-
cording to their general class; "consequently, any one local government has
189. Id.
190. Whatever the virtues of local autonomy, intervention by the courts and state and federal
legislatures is sometimes necessary to ensure that local governments operate fairly and act
reasonably. Local responsiveness to a zoning problem, for example, can address local concerns
and encourage local development opportunities, but zoning ordinances may be used to preserve
racial homogeneity in a community. Furthermore, local development policies which directly
involve local officials in long-term development decisions may be seen as an unwarranted
invasion of private property rights by those who presume that local government should facilitate
growth, not direct or control it. See G. Clark, supra note 187, at 21. Furthermore, some argue
that local governments lack the protection of federal and state separation of powers doctrine
and that few procedural codes restrict local government actions. Local governments, they
suggest, are the "true wilderness of administrative law," and serious problems of fairness often
attend their actions. G. ROBINSON, E. GELHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
698 (3d ed. 1986).
191. The principle of local autonomy has also been justified on empirical notions of scale,
efficiency and size. Some suggest that national life is simply too complex, too large and too
impersonal to create social communities of like-minded people with the power to structure
social life. See G. CLARK, supra note 187, at 196-98.
192. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
694 (1977).
193. G. CLARK, supra note 187, at 189.
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only those powers granted its class, which may or may not be finely detailed
enough to be relevant in many different possible circumstances."' ' 94
A state may choose to expressly prohibit development impact fees, off-
site exactions, or linkage ordinances because of state-wide policy concerns
about the extent to which new development should bear the costs of com-
munity expansion and the impact of local development on adjacent govern-
ments and municipalities. 195 In the absence of specific statutory prohibition,
however, courts should encourage local government innovation, initiative,
and the values of local autonomy in cases challenging municipal authority
under an ultra vires attack. These concerns today generally outweigh the
need for state-wide uniform standards governing exactions and development
fees.
Rather than regarding cities as mere instrumentalities of the state for the
convenient administration of government within their limits,'9 courts should
encourage local officials, who are most directly responsible to the local
citizenry, to address issues of local development and to evolve solutions to
their long-term capital financing problems without the constant need to seek
express authorization from the state.197 The courts can continue to protect
individuals from unreasonable or arbitrary municipal actions on a case-by-
case basis by applying a constitutionally mandated reasonableness test, such
as the rational nexus test, and by requiring municipalities to meet the
requirements of procedural due process and equal protection. 198 But it is
194. Id.
195. Some states prohibit certain conditions as a part of rezoning. For example, VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-491.2 (1989) provides, in part, as follows:
A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing,
by the owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the
governing body, in addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district or
zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map;
provided that (i) the rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions;
(ii) such conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; (iii) such
conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the county or municipality; (iv)
such conditions shall not include mandatory dedication of real or personal property
for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not
otherwise provided for in subdivision A (f) of sec. 15.1-466; (v) such conditions
shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements except those
provided for in subdivision A (j) of sec. 15.1-466; (vi) no condition shall be proffered
that is not related to the physical development or physical operation of the property;
and (vii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as
defined in sec. 15.1-446.1.
196. See Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883)
(stating that municipal corporations were merely instrumentalities of the state for the convenient
administration of state government).
197. See Note, supra note 106, at 679 (stating that, ideally, under home rule, a "locality
would possess the authority to evolve solutions to its individual problems and to experiment
with new approaches to effective government without first seeking authorization from the state
legislature").
198. Due process requirements limit the manner in which government may exercise its power,
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time to loosen the grip of state control on local decisionmaking. As financial
pressure increases and available resources continue to shrink in our highly
urbanized nation, city impotence under traditional doctrines of state control
is no longer justified. The policies underlying the movement toward local
autonomy and home rule require a rethinking by the courts of their role in
determining the extent of municipal power. Courts should support local
governments' attempts to address their cumulative capital development prob-
lems through reasonably proportioned off-site exactions or development fees
by broadly construing their power to do so unless such exactions or fees are
expressly prohibited by statute.
V. CONCLUSION
It is the responsibility of local governments to provide and maintain general
public improvements such as streets and roads, parks, schools, and water
and sewage facilities within their jurisdictions. As municipalities grow, so
grow the costs of maintaining and providing those improvements. In the
face of rapid suburban growth and often seriously deteriorating infrastruc-
ture, municipalities must now address the need for major capital improve-
ment and expansion projects while resources to fund those projects are
limited.'1 While cities deal with a declining ability to generate income and
stringent restraints on their ability to borrow money,2°° their fiscal problems
are exacerbated by inaction and under-appropriation by federal and state
governments. 20'
As municipalities search for creative ways to allocate the capital costs of
explosive suburban growth, it is virtually certain that they will continue to
a limitation which basically requires the municipality to play by rules that are fair. This means
that an individual must receive notice of an impending decision that affects him, receive
information upon which the decision is to be made, and be given the opportunity to present
his information and arguments in his favor. See generally Siemon, supra note 9, at 120.
Some developers have argued that mandatory impact fees illegally discriminate against new
development. E.g., Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
However, equal protection claims have usually been rejected by the courts in these cases. See
Larsen & Zimet, supra note 9, at 493 n.17.
199. Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 9, at 140.
200. Frug, supra note 5, at 1064. Frug notes that city income is largely dependent on
something cities cannot control-the willingness of taxpayers to locate or do business within
city boundaries:
The problem of increasing exodus of wealthier taxpayers, including businesses, from
the nation's major cities is notorious. Even if cities could ensure that taxpayers
remained within their borders, however, current law does not allow cities to tax
them. Generally, every city decision to increase taxes must be expressly approved
by the state, and some states even have a constitutional limitation on the amount
of taxes permitted.
Id.
201. Nicholas, supra note 1, at 85 (stating that federal and state inaction and under-
appropriation have "forced" local governments to "direct available fiscal resources toward
operating and maintaining the facilities that state and federal grants originally paid for").
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turn to subdivision off-site exactions and fees as a potential source of
funding. Traditionally, subdivision exactions were limited to requirements
for construction or dedication for site-specific needs such as roads and
streets. Today, however, an increasing number of cities are turning to off-
site exactions, in-lieu fees, and impact fees as an alternative source of funds
for major capital improvements such as parks and schools or thoroughfare
improvements.
Not surprisingly, the use of off-site exactions and fees has generated
controversy. Proponents point to the municipality's obligation to provide
services while the costs for those services continue to increase and the sources
of municipal funding decrease. Opponents counter that such exactions are
really a form of municipal extortion and are inherently unfair because the
ultimate costs of such projects fall unequally on new residents to the com-
munity. As the debate continues, courts must address the legality of exaction
and impact fees on a case-by-case basis, first determining whether the
municipality had statutory authority to impose the exaction, and if so,
whether the exaction was valid as a reasonable police power regulation.2 °2
If the municipality's action is not authorized by state enabling legislation,
then the action is ultra vires and thus void. Most states today have adopted
some form of home rule legislation for local governments and all states have
adopted planning and subdivision control legislation.2 0 3 Yet many courts
refuse to find municipal authority for imposing off-site exactions and de-
velopment fees in such broad grants of statutory authority and require express
enabling legislation authorizing such exactions.
If municipalities are to solve the capital expansion problems associated
with rapid growth, courts should broadly construe a city's implied powers,
under home rule or other enabling legislation, to grant local governments
the authority to impose such exactions and fees unless expressly prohibited
by statute. Whether a particular exaction is a reasonable exercise of police
power should be determined on a case-by-case basis under a rational nexus
test which requires proof of a rational connection between the exaction
required and the needs created by or benefits conferred upon the new
development. 204 By granting local governments the implied power to address
cumulative capital development needs through reasonable off-site exactions
and fees, courts will encourage flexibility and innovation in finding solutions
to the needs generated by rapid suburban growth. At the same time, the
courts can ensure that new development will bear only its fair and reasonable
share of the capital development costs it generates.
202. Different states require a municipality to meet different burdens of proof in validating
its exercise of the police power, but recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a trend toward
greater scrutiny of local land use control decisions. See supra notes 178-80, and accompanying
text.
203. Pavelko, supra note 9, at 280 (citing list of several state subdivision control legislation
provisions).
204. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
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